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Abstract. Small satellites are becoming the solution of choice for planners trying to reduce space mission costs and
shorten schedules. Secondary launches are a quick, frequent, low-cost, reliable solution for small satellites. Most
international small spacecraft are launched as secondary piggyback payloads, aboard larger more efficient rockets.
However, piggyback accommodations in the US are rare, done only on a case-by-case basis, and far from low cost.
AeroAstro is presently developing the Universal Small Payload Interface (USPI), a standardized template for
integrating and launching small spacecraft. It is designed so that mission developers can design to its requirements
in order to be compatible on demand with a number of different secondary launch vehicle slots. The ‘Phase A’
USPI, based exclusively on existing secondary opportunities, will be complete by August 2000. Phases B and C,
based on potential modifications of existing launch vehicles, will be complete by the end of the year. Missions will
be quickly designed to a common interface standard, decreasing their dependence on a specific launch. When the
spacecraft is ready, the next USPI launch available will be used, bringing ‘launch on-demand’ closer to reality.

Introduction
This paper discusses an assessment of US
capability to launch small or micro-satellites
using secondary or "piggyback" launches on
large commercial or military launch systems.
Secondary launches are payloads that
constitute less than 40% of the overall payload
being launched into orbits dependent upon the
orbit of the larger – primary – payload. The
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assessment is a part of the Universal Small
Payload Interface (USPI) project sponsored by
the US National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) Office of Space Launch (OSL).
The motivation for the USPI project is to
foster US small satellite development by
allowing cheaper access to space for small,
micro, and pico-satellites.
Per-kilogram
launch costs for small launchers are roughly
14th Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites

three times higher than for large capacity
launchers, while the larger launchers tend to
have unused payload mass at launch.
Therefore, exploiting that extra mass capacity
for small satellites with standard piggyback
payload adapters would allow cheaper access
to space for these satellites.
Anecdotal
evidence suggests that US government policy
– as the major launch systems customer – has
not fostered piggyback launches for small
satellites in the US. This paper examines that
issue with historical data on piggyback
launches and current and future piggyback
accommodations. The assessment used the
European Ariane 4 launcher and its ASAP 4
adapter as a benchmark to highlight the
opportunities available for small satellites with
standard piggyback payload adapters and
proactive launch policies.

piggyback payloads tend to skew the
piggyback launch data, they are considered
shared or co-manifested payloads. Multiple
payload launches (like Iridium and Orbcomm)
also are not considered, as they control the
insertion orbit and are basically treated as
primary payloads.

The following section describes the criteria
used in the assessment of US piggyback
launch capabilities. Following the assessment
criteria is the assessment of historical, present,
and planned US piggyback capabilities and a
discussion of the conclusions based on the
assessment.

For some small launch vehicles (most notably
Pegasus XL), 100 kg payloads are a large
fraction of available capacity. Since these

Assessments should not be made in isolation,
so US piggyback launch capabilities need to
be assessed vis-à-vis the strongest competition
– a benchmark. Historically, the Soviet Union
– and now Russia – has been the US’ major
competitor in space.
However, the
geopolitical competition between the two
powers has always overshadowed and strongly
influenced their competition in space. On the
other hand, the Ariane 4 launcher,
commercially offered as a launch service by
Arianespace SA, has become the dominant
commercial satellite launch system over the
last two decades. The Ariane 4 – with the
Ariane Structure for Auxiliary Payloads
(ASAP 4) – is also the major adapter for
piggyback launches to Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
and Geo-stationary Transfer Orbit (GTO).
Therefore, Ariane has been chosen as the
benchmark for US piggyback capability
assessment. ASAP 4 has proven the technical
and commercial viability of piggyback
payloads.
It has also demonstrated the
viability of the European Space Agency
(ESA) policy of nurturing small satellite
development
by
supporting
standard
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Assessment Criteria
A launcher’s ability to launch small secondary
payloads with a much larger primary payload
is the primary criterion of assessment.
To qualify as a piggyback, a payload has to:
• Be less than 100 kg
• Be launched with a much larger payload –
the piggyback payload should be less than
40% of the total mass launched on that
particular mission
• Be listed as an auxiliary payload on the
launch manifest data
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Piggyback capabilities can be assessed by:
• The launcher’s historical record of
piggyback launches
• The consistency of the launcher’s
piggyback payload attachment (i.e. is there
a standard attachment interface)
• The provider’s policy regarding piggyback
payloads
• The transparency and ease of the process
for getting a piggyback payload on a
launcher

piggyback accommodations on Ariane 4
launches. For these reasons, Ariane 4 is the
most appropriate benchmark for assessing US
piggyback capability.

Historical Piggyback Capability
Figure 1 shows piggyback payloads as
percentages of all payloads launched through
1999. The raw data are skewed by the launch
of Russian and US (Orbcomm) satellite
clusters. These data show small/piggyback
payloads accounting for 6% of the global total
and 8% of the US (i.e., the US piggyback
payload launch rate is on par with the global
rate in overall percentages). However, the US
should have launched more piggyback
satellites compared to the benchmark Ariane
4, because they had more launches with the
same or better payload mass margin available.
Figure 2 shows piggyback payloads as a
percentage of all payloads launched by each
active US launch vehicle (the high percentage
of Pegasus small payloads are co-manifested
launches, mostly for the Orbcomm
constellation). US vehicles have launched a
smaller percentage of piggyback payloads
than Ariane 4. Ariane 4’s dominance of the
commercial communications satellite market

has also forced the majority of Ariane 4
launches to GTO, reducing its share of
piggyback launches (since GTO does not
seem very attractive for small spacecraft
users/ designers). The higher proportion of
Ariane 4 piggyback launches therefore reflects
a much weaker historical US position vis-à-vis
piggyback payloads. The major reason for
this discrepency between the two sets of data
is that ESA policy has effectively forced
Arianespace
to
offer
piggyback
accommodations whenever possible.
Figure 3 shows the global distribution of
piggyback payloads by mass with the majority
in the 40-80 kg ranges.
Soviet/Russian
payloads dominated the 60-80 kg range while
the only range with predominantly US
payloads is the 40-60 kg range. Russian
predominance in the 60-80 kg range is
primarily a historical artifact (although there
have been a significant number of
Soviet/former Soviet piggyback launches, a
large number of launches in the early years of
the space age were below 100 kg because of
lesser payload capacities).
Ignoring the
Russian data, there is again a very strong
representation by Ariane piggyback payloads
across the mass ranges. This highlights ASAP
4’s capability of handling a wide variety of
payloads with the standard piggyback adapter.

100-200kg
under
2%
100kg
4%

over 200kg
94%

100-200kg
2%
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100kg
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92%

World Payloads

U.S. Payloads

Figure 1. Piggyback Payloads Launched Through 19991
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U.S. Payloads by Launch Vehicle
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Figure 2. Piggyback Payload Launches by Launch Vehicle for US Vehicles1
The majority of payloads under 100 kg are actually co-manifests – mostly for the Orbcomm constellation..
Ariane data provided for reference.
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Figure 3. Distribution of Small Payloads According to Size1
The majority of US piggybacks (45%) are in the 40-60 kg range.
Ignoring the Russian payloads in the 60-80 kg range, Ariane piggybacks are generally across the range.
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Payloads by Orbit
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Figure 4. Distribution of Payloads According to Orbit Type1
Some of the small payload data is skewed by small US payloads launched as primaries.
Note no US piggyback launches to GTO.

Figure 4 shows all payloads launched by orbit
type. The balanced mix of US scientific/
military
and
government/commercial
communications payloads accounts for the
distribution between LEO and GTO. Polar
and sun-synchronous orbits tend to be for
earth
observation
and
reconnaissance
satellites, again borne out by more US
launches in the polar orbit group. On the
other hand, the predominance of GEO for
communications satellites accounts for the
Ariane 4 launch data.
Piggyback payload data by orbits show the
majority of US small satellite launches went to
LEO, but the data are skewed by Pegasus and
older vehicles launching smaller primary
payloads. Most remarkable is the large
percentage of Ariane piggyback payloads.
Even the least desirable GTO orbit (piggyback
satellites tend to go mostly to LEO – low
inclination or polar/sun-synchronous) has
4.5% Ariane piggyback launches, contrasting
with 0% (of 208 total) for US launchers. Two
of the three total Ariane 4 LEO launches and
75% of Ariane 4 launches to polar and sunsynchronous orbits have had piggyback
payloads. This contrasts with less than 18%
for US polar and sun-synchronous launches.

commercial satellites that would be excellent
candidates for piggyback launches have had to
pay for dedicated launches or wait for lack of
inexpensive access. The US has generally
failed to use its strong position in launch
systems to foster small, cost-effective
satellites by offering launch payload margin as
accommodations for secondary/piggyback
payloads.
Three major standard adapters are available
for piggyback payloads:
• The US STS systems controlled by the
Hitchhiker Customer Accommodations
and Requirements Specifications (CARS)
740-SPEC-008:
- Hitchhiker Ejection System (HES)
- Payload Ejection System (PES)
- Shuttle
Hitchhiker
Experiment
Launch System (SHELS)
• The Delta II secondary payload facility
• The Ariane Structure for Auxiliary
Payloads (ASAP) 4 – now being updated
to ASAP 5

This data contrasts with the fact that a
considerable number of US scientific and

STS piggyback launches are exclusively for
US Government payloads, and its unstable
manifest often adversely affects piggyback
launch schedules. The Delta II secondary
requirements and accommodations are
unstable because the primary payload
variation and customized secondary payload
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accommodations
complicate
piggyback
payload design. The ASAP 4 standard is
easier to use than Hitchhiker CARS and Delta
II because it has precise and clear piggyback
payload design and integration requirements.
If an ASAP 4 ring is carried on a mission, the
piggyback customers have stable requirements
they can design to. Piggyback launches–
especially for US organizations – have been
literally or nominally free. But that does not
reflect the hidden costs for qualifying and
integrating the payloads.* Piggyback payload
customers on Ariane 4 pay for the service.
The fee possibly reflects less the actual ASAP
4 costs and more an active ESA policy to
encourage small and auxiliary payload
launches.
Consequently,
piggyback
customers, given a choice between paying for
the convenience of ASAP 4 piggyback
launches to limited orbits and on limited
launches, or free US piggyback launches to
more orbits on more launches on sufferance
from the primary payload, have opted for the
former.

Current Piggyback Capability

Ariane 4
The Ariane 4 has been operational since 1988,
with a 96% launch success rate. It is now
being phased out in favor of the Ariane 5.
There are 20 commercial Ariane 4 launches
manifested to 2004.3
Multiple small payloads can be mounted on
the ASAP 4 structure installed around the
primary payload adapter. Each piggyback
payload must be less than 50 kg with a
combined piggyback mass no more than 200
kg. Each payload has to fit in a 0.45m x
0.45m x 0.45m cube.
No published costs are available, but costs per
piggyback are estimated at $1–$3 million.
Piggyback slots are allotted through a
commercial application. No published data
are available on the piggyback manifest. The
last ASAP 4 piggyback launch was in 1997.
Delta II

Current piggyback capability assessment
involved
all
operational
launchers
commercially available worldwide as well as
US launchers used solely for government
launches.** Most operational launch systems†
can carry piggyback payloads but only a few
have standardized accommodations for them.
Therefore only the following five launchers

*

Essentially, the pricing (free) is driven by policy
directives (patron of science) that do not necessarily
coincide with NASA policy directives for the safest
possible STS mission.
**
For example, the US Titan II-23G and Titan IV
systems were examined but not discussed because they
do not offer piggyback accommodations.
†
Most Soviet launchers have carried piggyback
payloads but published data suggest they have no
standard piggyback accommodations.
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have been included in current piggyback
capability assessment. ††
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The Delta II has been operational since 1990,
with a 94.5% overall success rate. There are
16 Delta II launches manifested to 2002.3
Piggyback payloads can be attached to the
sides of the second-stage avionics section,
between the second stage and the payload
fairing. The available space is a slice of a
toroidal section 0.33m thick and 0.78m tall.
Piggyback payloads are paid for by NASA,
USAF, or the payload user. Piggyback slots
are awarded ad hoc based on government
manifests with available space. It is possible
to examine the published manifest, confer
††

Piggyback carriage on OSP/Minotaur is not yet
standardized but the stated policy for this launcher to
carry small secondary payloads for the
scientific/government community merits inclusion.
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with the prime payload customer to discover
available space and payload margin and
convince NASA to allow a piggyback payload
on that launch. The process is somewhat
opaque and piggyback launches are not
guaranteed. No published data are available
on the piggyback manifest.
The last
*
piggyback launch was in 1999.

OSC is also capable of launching piggyback
payloads on the Taurus launcher using the
DPAF attachment. The accommodations for
piggyback are similar, so the information for
Pegasus XL is also applicable for Taurus. The
Pegasus XL is the commercially available
version, and there are 62 Pegasus XL launches
forecasted to 2008.3

OSP/Minotaur

Pegasus XL piggyback payloads are really comanifested payloads. Co-manifests can be
load-bearing custom or non-load-bearing
configurations using the Dual Payload Attach
Fitting (DPAF). DPAF payloads have a
0.22m tall, 0.26m diameter allowable volume.
Co-manifest masses are defined by the overall
mission payload capability available.

The Minotaur is a refurbished LGM-30F
Minuteman II ICBM, primarily for
government sponsored sub-orbital or orbital
payloads.
It has been operational since
January 2000. The Teal Group3 forecasts an
average of 2 launches per year, with 450
Minuteman II missiles in storage and available
for conversion.
Piggyback payloads can be co-manifested or
shared with other payloads with all piggyback
masses, volumes, and facilities determined by
the primary payload. Payloads can be –
depending on available volume – stacked,
installed in load carrying structures, or carried
in multiple payload dispensers.2 The payload
carriage design is still very fluid and there is
no discernible standard.
Piggyback
launches
are
government
subsidized,** and there is no established
procedure for getting piggyback payloads on a
Minotaur launch. The only Minotaur launch
thus far – in January 2000 – was a piggyback
launch of ten satellites.†
Pegasus
Pegasus has been commercially operational
since 1992, with an 80% overall success rate.1
*

Two 64 kg payloads – one Danish and one South
African – to sun-synchronous orbits
**
The government agency sponsoring a payload has to
pay up to $11-$13 million per launch
†
JAWsat, ASUsat, OPAL – carrying 6 picosats, OCSE
for AFRL, and Falconsat
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Pegasus costs $18 million per launch, and comanifests share the cost. The Orbital Sciences
Corporation (OSC) creates co-manifests
through commercial application for use.
STS
The Space Shuttle (STS) is the world’s only
reusable and the only manned US launch
system. The four operational orbiters are each
designed for 100 flights, so the fleet is good
for about 300 more missions. Current flight
rate for the fleet is about 8-10 missions per
year. 3
Piggyback payloads use the Shuttle Hitchhiker
Ejection System (HES) in the STS main
payload bay.
The HES system can be
enclosed or open to the payload bay and can
eject the payload with a given velocity. The
payload mass can be up to 68 kg and must
have a 0.48 m diameter and 0.52 m height.
The number of piggyback payloads carried on
a given STS mission depends on payload bay
availability.7
Table 1 summarizes the piggyback capabilities
of the launchers mentioned above.
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Table 1. Summary of Piggyback Capabilities for Selected Launchers
Launchers

Mass (kg)

Space (m)

Ariane 4

50 kg

Delta II

Open

0.45m X
0.45m X
0.45 m
Open

Pegasus
XL

Dependent
on other
payload
Dependent
on other
payloads
68 kg

OSP/
Minotaur
STS

0.26m dia.
0.22m ht.
Dependen
t on other
payloads
0.48m dia.
0.52m ht.

Piggyback
Procedure
Transparent.
Application for
use
Fluid. NASA
application

Orbits

Commercial

LEO,
GTO

Yes

LEO,
GTO

Transparent.
Application for
use
Open.
Not yet defined

LEO

Commercial
or Govt.
sponsored
Yes

Opaque.
Ad hoc, secondary
to manned mission

LEO

Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) is the
only US provider actively pursuing piggyback
payloads for their launchers. Specifically,
OSC is seeking piggback payloads for the
Pegasus/Taurus systems.4,5 The Delta II and
STS piggyback application and mission
approval procedures remain opaque and
subject to primary payload mission objectives.
Although STS has well-established piggyback
specifications, the integration and review
procedures
remain
onerous.
The
OSP/Minotaur is a promising low-cost small
satellite launcher, but it is not yet fully
operational with well-defined piggyback
application procedures.
Projected Piggyback Capability
There are four major initiatives that could
significantly affect US piggyback capabilities:
1) EELV Secondary Payload Attachment
(ESPA)
2) Piggyback launch brokering
3) ASAP 5 for Ariane 5, PSLV (The Polar
Satellite Launch Vehicle now being
marketed by the Antrix corporation for the
Indian Space Research Organization), and
Soyuz ST/Fregat
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LEO

Govt.
sponsorship
reqd.
Govt.
payloads
only

Cost/
payload ($)
$1-$3
million per
slot
Nominally
free
Sharing $18
million per
launch
$11-$13
million per
launch
Nominally
free

4) Aggressive marketing of decommissioned
Russian ICBM’s
The first two present a potential boost to US
piggyback launch opportunities while the
latter two represent commercially available
cheap and reliable alternatives.
ESPA
The USAF Space Test Program (STP) and the
Air Force Research Labs (AFRL) are
developing ESPA for the planned Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). ESPA
is an annular ring above the Spacecraft
Interface Plane (SIP) with the piggyback
payloads cantilevered out from it. ESPA can
carry up to eight 180 kg piggyback payloads
in a 0.61m x 0.61m x 0.97m volume.
ESPA is scheduled for operation by 2003. Its
major design limitation is the requirement to
fit the piggyback payloads above the SIP
without impinging on the primary payload
volume. This has forced the piggyback
payloads to be cantilevered out radially –
making them more susceptible to launcher
axial vibration and constraining their available
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volume. According to STP analyses, typical
EELV missions may have more than 25%
mass margins but piggyback payloads may not
always be allowed. With the ESPA location
above the SIP it is not entirely clear who has
ultimate responsibility for it – the payload or
the launch vehicle side. The launch vehicle
providers do not consider it their
responsibility and have yet to qualify it on
their vehicles.
If successful, ESPA could potentially launch a
significant number of US piggyback satellites.
The USAF estimates that the operational
EELV system would have 18-20 launches
annually. Assuming half of those launches
could carry 6 piggyback payloads each, 54-60
piggyback payloads could be launched
annually. This rate would surpass the total
number of US piggyback launches (see Figure
4) in less than two years!
ESPA is a good design effort to exploit excess
EELV* capability, but it may be infeasible to
standardize ESPA across other US platforms.
Because the piggyback payloads are radially
placed, the piggyback payloads are volume
constrained between the payload adapter side
and fairing envelope. Furthermore, because of
the specialized piggyback payload interface
design, payloads designed for other launch
systems cannot be changed over to ESPA.
Although that does insulate ESPA payloads
from being "poached" by ASAP 5, it does
reduce US piggyback customers’ options.
Launch Brokering
The US firm Space Operations International
(SOI) has a commercial initiative to broker
excess payload mass margin to small payload
customers as piggyback opportunities. A US
launch services provider with excess payload
margin on a launch engages SOI to market
*

Other launch vehicle designs, most notable the Kistler
K1, plan to use a variation of ESPA
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that capacity. SOI solicits the customers,
helps them design and qualify the payload,
and integrates it with the primary payload.
SOI claims to have memoranda of
understanding with Boeing, Lockheed-Martin,
Kistler
Aerospace,
and
Sealaunch.
Partner/investor Ball Aerospace will probably
provide the technical and integration
expertise.
SOI has an innovative idea to commercially
exploit excess capacity on launch manifests.
Launch service providers are interested in
selling excess payload margin for profit but
don’t want the overhead of finding a
piggyback customer and helping them
integrate with the launcher and primary
payload.
The SOI initiative outsources
piggyback marketing for the launch service
providers. The exact business plan and
potential for profit or success is unclear, but
this concept could potentially provide cheap
piggyback payload access for US small
satellite developers and users.
SOI is
hamstrung by ITAR and other US government
restrictions that considerably narrow their
field by limiting them to US launchers. A
freer hand for SOI could potentially free up
more piggyback opportunities for small
satellite users.
ASAP 5
ASAP 5 is the ASAP 4’s adaptation for the
Ariane 5. Ariane 5 is now operational,
although there has not been an ASAP 5
mission to date. Two versions of ASAP 5 are
available:
1) Carry up to 8 piggybacks with a maximum
aggregate mass of 800 kg; allowable
volume per payload is 0.6m x 0.6m x
0.8m; allowable mass per payload is 100
kg maximum
2) Carry up to 4 piggybacks with maximum
aggregate mass of 1,200 kg; allowable
volume per payload is 1.5m diameter and
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1.5 m height; allowable mass per payload
is 300 kg maximum
Ariane guarantees a piggyback launch – once
contracted – on any one of three launchers:
1) Ariane 5
2) The Indian Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle
(PSLV)
3) The Soyuz ST/Fregat vehicle marketed by
Starsem
The PSLV is not yet commercially operational
while the Soyuz ST/Fregat is the latest
iteration of the workhorse Soviet/Russian
launcher. The Soyuz ST/Fregat version has an
Ariane 4 type payload fairing and is being
marketed by Arianespace as its medium lift
vehicle for polar and sun-synchronous orbits
and for LEO constellations. 6 Soyuz ST/Fregat
will be operational by the second half of 2001.
ASAP 5 is a bigger threat to US piggyback
launch efforts than ASAP 4 for a few reasons.
• ASAP 5 allows larger piggyback payloads
with more mass. Small satellite makers
will be less constrained by mass and
volume than they were with ASAP 4.
• The larger mass allowance may let some
piggyback customers add propulsion
modules* to optimize orbits. For example,
Arianespace has an entered into an
agreement with AeroAstro Inc. (authors of
this paper) for the SPORT™ – Small
Payload Orbit Transfer – system. SPORT
will take a piggyback payload from GTO
to LEO by reducing the apogee with drag
and then circularizing at LEO. SPORT
will allow more piggyback payloads on
launches to GTO, reducing another
weakness of the ASAP 4 system.
• The Ariane 5, PSLV, Soyuz ST/Fregat
combination gives Arianespace better
coverage of orbits. Figure 4 suggests there

•

•

would have been more piggyback launches
if more Ariane 4’s had gone to LEO. This
will no longer be an issue with ASAP 5.
ASAP 5 will have more available
launches. Ariane 5 has 62 projected
launches to 20073 and Soyuz ST/Fregat
has 5 launches planned per year.6
Finally, the recent addition of the Eurockot
launcher (see section below on "SALT"
launchers)6 broadens Arianespace product
coverage. The larger ASAP 5 can take a
larger variety of piggyback payloads. If
more capacity is required, a customer can
move up to the Eurockot.

There is as yet no concerted effort to counter
the ASAP 5 threat from any launch service
providers, combination of commercial
organizations, or any other government
organization in the US. As is, Arianespace
will further enhance experience in small
satellite development at the expense of US
small satellite developers limited by US
policies of exclusivity for US-sponsored
projects and policy restrictions against using
foreign launchers. The lack of a standardized
US piggyback launch adapter also does not
allow US small satellite developers to design,
build, and use standard small and microsatellites buses.
"SALT" Launchers
The SALT II treaty has decommissioned a
large number of ICBM’s from Russia,
Ukraine, and the US. The US has successfully
converted one LGM-30F Minuteman II to the
OSP/Minotaur launcher and plans the same
with more of the 450 in storage.3 The
Russians are marketing a number of their
decommissioned ICBM’s, most successfully
the Eurockot launcher. Table 2 summarizes
the information about these launchers. “Start”
in this case means “launch” in Russian.

*

Unlike US launchers, ASAP has been less stringent
about pyrotechnics and propulsion on piggyback
payloads
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Table 2. Summary Information about "SALT" Launchers
Launcher
Dnepr

Lineage
SS18/Yuzhnoye
RS20

Cost/Launch ($)
$10 Million

Launch
UoSAT 12, 1999

Eurockot

SS19

$5-12 Million

Two Iridium (US),
1999

Minotaur

$11-13 Million

Shtil

LGM-30F
Minuteman II
R29RM SSN23

Multiple microsats
(US), 2000
Two TUBsat, 1998

Start &
Start 1

SS25/RT-2PM
Topol

$9-10.5 Million

$100-300 K

All the launchers in Table 2 have good
payload capability to LEO, in the Pegasus XL
and Taurus launchers’ range. They compete
against piggyback launch by offering very
cost effective launch services for satellites
above the 200 kg range.
The launch
environments for all these launchers are very
robust, but they are reliable and have fast
turnaround times.
The Eurockot is the most commercially stable
of the SALT launchers, it was previously
marketed by Daimler Chrysler Aerospace
(DASA) and is now a part of the Arianespace
line. The European Space Agency (ESA)
officially considers the Eurockot its light
launcher of choice.6 Government restrictions
notwithstanding, two of the launchers –
Eurockot and Start 1 – have launched US
satellites and two – Dnepr and Start – are
marketed by US companies.
Pegasus was conceived for
launches but is now more
kilogram launched * than large
Minotaur, as a recycled

small satellite
expensive per
launchers. The
missile, was

Gerwin 1 (ISR),
Unamsat (MEX),
Early Bird 1 (US)

Comments
Silo launched above
ground. Commercially
marketed by Kosmotras
and Thiokol Technology
Silo launched above
ground. Smallest
Arianespace launcher
Managed by OSC. Not
commercially marketed
Submarine launched.
Commercially marketed
by Russian Navy
Commercially marketed
by Puskovie Uslugi &
United Start

considered its biggest competitor. Table 2
suggests the SALT launchers will compete
very strongly with those as well as the
piggybacks on larger launchers.
US payloads may not be allowed on the
Russian SALT launchers,** but commercial
small payloads have no such restrictions.
Surrey Satellite Limited of the UK is not
under any such restrictions and has built an
enviable experience base on most small and
piggyback launchers.† Therefore, non-US
organizations are building a better experience
base launching small and micro-satellites
using piggyback facilities unavailable to US
users because of US government policies.
Policy Issues
Launch vehicle providers do not see any
technical hurdles to more piggyback launches.
There is some overhead cost in dealing with
piggyback customers and they would prefer
**

FAA price data suggests Pegasus/Taurus are nearly
three times more expensive in $/kg terms than larger
launchers. FAA data is usually considered optimistic.

The ITAR status of Eurockot is unclear. Iridium has
been launched on Eurockot. Ariane 4 and 5 launches
are unrestricted for US payloads. US governmentsponsored payloads still have to be launched on US
launchers.
†
Surrey has launched micro-satellites piggyback on
ASAP 4, Zenit, Dnepr, Shtil, Tsiklon, and Kosmos.
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someone else (like a broker) taking care of
them. Overall, they don’t see an attractive
enough business case for standard piggyback
accommodations on their launchers. They
contend that the government – under constant
budget pressure – would pay them less for the
prime payload if they charged fees for
piggyback launches. There is insufficient
evidence to rebut that. Therefore, launch
vehicle providers are not likely to be open to
piggyback launches – or standardized adapters
for them – until the government mandates they
do so or allows them to keep the resulting
profits.
There is some government interest in
piggyback launches. There is also some belief
that US launch vehicle providers are
uninterested in piggyback launches because
USAF Material Command (AFMC) is not
pushing them. AFMC does not have a formal
operational requirement for small and
piggyback launches from USAF Space
Command (SPC). SPC very probably agrees
with the piggyback launch concept and
supports efforts like ESPA, but until small
satellites and piggyback launches prove
operational capability for war-fighting – or
they are mandated by policy to do so – they
have no reason to issue a requirement. The
timing might be right for a large government
prime payload customer to push for such a
requirement.

3. Government policy and the business case,
not technical challenges, are the significant
hindrances to more US piggyback launches.
4. US Government policy to restrict
government-sponsored payloads to US
launchers
harms
small/micro-satellite
development by not allowing them more
cheap missions to space.
5. Free piggyback payload launches are not
enough; transparent procedures for reliable
piggyback payload slots are also critical.
6. Decommissioned ICBM launches overseas
provide cheap, reliable access to space for
small satellites but US small satellite
developers are restricted by US government
policy to US launchers.
7. The NRO should push for an operational
requirement for piggyback payload launches
to encourage large launch vehicle contractors.
8. ASAP 5 provides a single, standardized
piggyback payload adapter that covers GTO
and low inclination & polar LEO orbits with
three major launchers: Ariane 5, PSLV, and
Soyuz ST/Fregat. There is no comparable US
piggyback initiative.
9. Ride brokering may give the US a
competitive advantage but the business plan is
unproven.

Conclusions
1. Historical US piggyback launch rates are on
par with global data but the US has not
exploited its payload margins as well as the
competition.
2. The EELV Secondary Payload Adapter
(ESPA) is a good design effort to exploit
EELV payload margins but it cannot be
standardized for other US launchers.
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